By Kevin E. Noonan --
The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) submitted an amicus brief today to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the Amgen v. Hoffman-LaRoche case (see "Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee and Affirmance
"). This case involves Roche's Mircera® drug product, a form of recombinant EPO that has been covalently linked to polyethylene glycol. Last October, a jury found that Mircera® infringed several Amgen patents. That verdict found that Roche's Mircera® infringed claims 3, 7, and 8 of Amgen's U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (claim 12 was found not to be literally infringed but infringed under the Doctrine of Equivalents); claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,441,868; and claims 6 through 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,618,698. (Amgen's infringed claims were directed to recombinant methods and recombinant EPO protein.) In addition, the jury found that Roche had not sustained its burden of establishing that any of Amgen's asserted claims were invalid (see "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge").
On February 28, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Judge William G. Young, presiding) granted a preliminary injunction to Amgen against Hoffman La-Roche, preventing Roche from selling Mircera®. Using the four-factor test set forth by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the District Court relied upon the jury verdict that Amgen's asserted claims were infringed and not invalid; in addition, the Court found that Amgen's injury would not be adequately compensated merely with money damages, and that the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of granting the injunction. The District Court struggled with the public interest prong of the test, in view of Roche's argument that the public interest was served by the (presumed) reduced drug price that would ensue from competition between Mircera® and Amgen's Epogen® and Aranesp® products, as well as Roche's representations of the advantages of its Mircera® product over Amgen's version of EPO (including inter alia less frequent dosing; see "Long-Acting Drug for Dialysis Anemia Equivalent to Weekly Agent").
The District Court set out conditions under which it would modify the injunction, conditions that amounted to a compulsory license. These included: first, that Roche would pay Amgen a royalty of 22.5%; second, Mircera® would be introduced to the Medicare patient population at a cost no less than the average sales price of Amgen's EPO products; third, Roche would have to provide clinical evidence to permit the Court to determine a "dosage conversion factor" between Mircera® and Epogen®; fourth, Roche would pay for an independent agency to monitor sales and determine royalty payments owed to Amgen; and finally, Roche would agree to supply Mircera® to any patient needing it, at or below the authorized price. Although Roche agreed to these terms (see "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction"), the Court decided it needed the advice of a special master to consider the question of how dosing and pricing of Amgen's and Roche's products should be compared. Instead of agreeing to provide the District Court with a list of candidates to be special master, Roche filed its appeal to the Federal Circuit on April 11, 2008 (see "Hoffmann-LaRoche Can't Wait, Files Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit").
BIO's brief addresses a single issue before the Federal Circuit: should the public interest prong of the eBay four-factor test be construed to encompass the "public interest" in lower drug prices. BIO's brief argues that it should not. First, BIO argues that the prospect of patent exclusivity is an important part of the patent grant, particularly for biotechnology companies. The brief recites the economic realities: that it can cost $1.2 billion to get a biologic drug to market; that "[b]iologics research and development is high-risk, with greater capital costs, higher material costs, greater manufacturing costs and uncertainties, longer development times, and lower late-stage success rates than small molecule pharmaceutical drugs"; and that sales of a biologic drug reach the break-even point for recovering the research and development costs at between approximately 12 and 16 years after the drug enters the marketplace. These economic realities are important, according to BIO, because investors will not be willing to take the significant risks attendant upon this technology unless there is a sufficient likelihood that a biologic drug will retain its market exclusivity for the maximum patent term.
BIO's brief also notes the irreparable harm to the patentee that would be caused by improvidently permitting an infringing product to enter the marketplace, particularly for a preliminary injunction. Besides price erosion, the brief notes that market entry of a competing product would be "virtually impossible to undo." Indeed, such a policy would serve to create a "public interest" when a court, as here in the face of a verdict of infringement and non-invalidity, would be considering a permanent injunction after the public has come to rely on a lower-priced competitor product.
The brief distinguishes eBay on its facts, being limited to a patentee that did not practice a business-method patent. BIO reminds the Federal Circuit that the Supreme Court held that the exercise of a court's injunctive relief powers "must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards," which standards have traditionally granted injunctions against infringing competitors. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The proper focus of the public interest analysis, according to BIO, should be "whether there exists some critical public interest that would be injured by the grant" of injunctive relief (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories , 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). In this regard, the brief cites numerous examples of courts granting injunctions but staying their implementation, in the public interest, to permit the patentee to obtain regulatory approval (Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, No. 94-105-RRM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24162, at *20-22, 50 (D. Del. July 24, 1997), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998)), or being capable of supplying the market with the patented article.
The brief also notes that considering the public interest in lower priced drugs as an appropriate measure of the "public interest" prong of the four-factor test is contrary to policy decisions made by Congress. In this regard, the brief cites the Bayh-Dole act, which contains severely restricted "march-in" rights provisions only in the face of unmet medical need, as well as the Hatch-Waxman Act, that actually increases patent term to an innovator as a recompense for regulatory delay. Nor does the Medicare Act support using lower drug prices as a sufficient equitable reason for denying an injunction, since Congress has refused to reduce reimbursement (which would achieve a similar purpose) without further study, which BIO's brief argues attests to the "the multifaceted nature of drug pricing issues, and underscores the delicate balance of competing economic and health care policies that is best left to the legislative branch." The brief also cites the numerous failed attempts to pass legislation authorizing compulsory patent licenses.
BIO reminds the Federal Circuit that is has already decided that it should be up to Congress, not the courts, to make the kinds of drug pricing decisions that would result from the proposed compulsory license for Mircera®. In Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), a case involving a District of Columbia city ordinance that would have mandated pricing of patented drugs, the Court said:
The present patent system reflects the result of Congress' deliberations. Congress has decided that patentees' present amount of exclusionary power, the present length of patent terms, and the present conditions for patentability represent the best balance between exclusion and free use.
And BIO argues that this represents a policy judgment by Congress that the Federal Circuit should respect "in applying the public interest prong of the four factor injunction test."
The brief makes one more, forceful and thoughtful point. If the Federal Circuit should hold that district courts can consider the "public interest" of lower drug prices as part of the public interest prong of the injunctive relief test under eBay, then the hallmark of the patent grant, exclusivity, would be decided in a case-by-case, ad hoc manner that would completely undermine the economic basis for patent protection and the benefits of the patent grant relied upon by investors. Moreover, appellate review of the district court's decision would be "under the deferential abuse of discretion standard," which would do nothing to ensure predictability of outcomes or the Federal Circuit's supervisory role under its Congressional implementing statute to bring consistency to U.S. patent law. Indeed, the brief argues that the effect of permitting district courts to consider lower drug prices would result in each district court acting as a drug "price czar," thereby undermining public policy and substituting Congressional deliberation with "a limited evidentiary record and the exercise of [a court's] equitable discretion." And the irony according to the brief is that the result may not be lower drug prices: in the case before the CAFC, the proposed compulsory license required Mircera® to be priced "at or less than" Amgen's erythropoietin products. This raises the real possibility that a compulsory license could be granted to an infringing competitor "with no price advantage to the consumer."
This can't be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it decided eBay, but the expansiveness of its pronouncements, in this as in other areas of patent law, have done little to promote the kind of certainty in this area of the law that Congress intended. A less activist Court might be willing to recognize, as the Supreme Court had been until recently, that patent law is one area where restraint in exercising its authority can be the more prudent course of action.
For additional information regarding this and other related topics, please see:
• "How to Avoid a Permanent Injunction: The Lessons of Amgen v. Hoffmann-LaRoche," April 28, 2008
• "Glasses Half-full or Half-empty: Hoffman-LaRoche's Different Interpretation of Pfizer v. Teva," April 15, 2008
• "Hoffmann-LaRoche Can't Wait, Files Notice of Appeal to the Federal Circuit," April 11, 2008
• "Will the Federal Circuit's Pfizer v. Teva Decision Spell the End of Amgen's Patent Rights to Recombinant Human Erythropoietin?" March 31, 2008
• "Court Still Cannot Decide on Amgen's Permanent Injunction," March 26, 2008
• "Amgen Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2008)," March 20, 2008
• "Roche Agrees to Court's Conditions for Modifying Preliminary Injunction," March 20, 2008
• "Roche's Mircera® Remains Off the Market (For Now)," March 2, 2008
• "Amgen Survives Another EPO Challenge," October 28, 2007
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